Monthly Archives: October 2012

Think like the judge

One way of thinking about the validity of your actions as an engineer is to imagine how they would be perceived by the inquiry following a disaster involving your work.  A while ago I used to be a bit apologetic, … Continue reading

Posted in Eng'g philosophy, Operations, Pipeline design, Risk assessment | 8 Comments

New AS 2885 ruling – Application of welding standard

Standards Australia has published a new ruling on the interpretation of AS 2885.1 concerning the application of AS 3992 (Pressure equipment—Welding and brazing qualification). The ruling is available for purchase here. I mention this only for the information of those … Continue reading

Posted in Standards | Leave a comment

Maui Pipeline Failure Reports

Almost exactly 12 months ago on 24 October 2011 there was a failure of the DN 750 Maui Pipeline which runs 307 km from from the Taranaki region to the Auckland region of New Zealand.  The pipe leaked as a result of … Continue reading

Posted in Incidents | 3 Comments

New toughness requirements in AS 2885

One of the less obvious changes in the recent revision of AS 2885 Part 1 was the inclusion of a requirement that almost all pipe must have a minimum toughness of 27 J, corresponding to the toughness required if API … Continue reading

Posted in Pipeline design, Standards | 14 Comments

Vent ignition follow-up

The previous post certainly generated discussion – a total of 10 useful comments (so far, and not counting my responses).  Thanks to all those who contributed.  I started replying to individual comments but it became a bit overwhelming so this … Continue reading

Posted in Incidents, Operations, Pipeline design | 10 Comments

Vent ignition

Around Australia there must be hundreds of blowdown vents on gas pipelines.  With a few minor variations the standard design is a short vertical pipe, maybe 2.5 m high, with a removable closure on top and a plug valve to … Continue reading

Posted in Incidents, Operations, Pipeline design | 16 Comments

Deviant engineering

I have just finished reading a dense but interesting book on the 1986 Challenger space shuttle disaster [1].  In a nutshell, the craft was destroyed 73 seconds after launch by a seal failure on one of the solid rocket boosters.  … Continue reading

Posted in Eng'g philosophy, Risk assessment | 6 Comments